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Tax reforms, sector specific labor supply and welfare effects 
by 
    John K. Dagsvik, Marilena Locatelli and Steinar Strøm 
Abstract: 
This paper focuses in particular on the 1992 tax reform in Norway. In this reform the top 
marginal tax rates were cut considerably. We find that the impact on overall labor supply is 
rather modest, but these modest changes shadow for stronger sectoral changes. The tax 
reform stimulated the women to shift their labor from the public to the private sector and to 
work longer hours. A calculation of mean compensated variation, calculated within the 
framework of a random utility model, shows that the richest households benefited far more 
from the 1992 tax reform than did the poorest households. 
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I. Introduction 
In the 1980s the keywords of tax reformers in the US and Europe were reduced tax rates and 
broadening of tax bases. The goal was to stimulate labor supply. In the 1990s OECD and the European 
Commison repeatedly argued that tax rates should be cut and that the tax systems should be changed 
towards proportional taxation. The tax reforms adopted by European countries introduced some 
changes in this direction, but the reforms have mainly implied streamlining of the existing tax systems, 
Bernardi and Profeta (2003). In the 1990s flat income tax has been proposed by many polticians as 
well as economists. Before 1990 it was only applied in a few countries like Hong Kong and the 
Channel Islands. In 1994 a flat tax system was introduced in Estonia and since then a number of 
countries have followed suit. By now there are altogether 22 countries worldwide with a flat tax 
system, of which half are in Eastern Europe, and proposals of introducing a flat income tax are 
discussed in several Western European countries, Paulus and Peichl (2008).  
 The Norwegian tax reform we analyze in this paper took place in 1992. The top marginal tax 
rate on wage income was reduced from 0.654 to 0.495, but also other tax rates were changed, and 
implied a sharp swing away from the existing progressive tax system. We also include an assessment 
of reforming the tax system further towards a flat income tax away from the existing progressive tax 
system. In this paper we use the labor supply model of Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) to evaluate the 
effects of the 1992 tax reform on labor supply of married females. We also evaluate the effects on 
household welfare. Furthermore, we assess the labor supply and welfare effects of a hypothetical 
fiuther tax reform where a flat tax is introduced. Whereas the emphasis in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) 
was on model specification and estimation, this paper is concerned with assessing labor supply effects 
that follow from the tax reforms, and in particular the corresponding welfare effects, evaluated by the 
Compensating Variation (CV) measure. Because our model is a particular version of a random utility 
model that is nonlinear in income, the calculation of CV is a rather complicated matter. Among other 
things, the CV becomes a random variable in this case. Until recently, no analytic formulas have been 
available for calculating the distribution of CV. However, Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) have 
developed analytic formulas for this purpose, and we apply their methodology to calculate the 
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distribution, mean CV and variances. Recently this methodology has been used to calculate welfare 
effects of family policies, Kornstad and Thoresen (2006), and to calculate the compensation that 
makes nurses indifferent between different types of jobs, Di Tommaso and Strøm (2008).To our 
knowledge our paper is the first where this methodology is used to assess the impact of tax reforms on 
household welfare. It is also the first paper that analyses the labor supply effects of the 1992 
Norwegian tax reform and where sectoral choices are accounted for, see Dagsvik, Locatelli and Strøm 
(2006) for a pr evious and larger version.  
 The sector dimension of the model allows us to go beyond overall labor supply responses to 
changes in wages and tax rates. Our hypothesis is that although overall labor supply may be rather 
inelastic, these modest labor supply responses may shadow for stronger responses with respect to 
sectoral choice. Highly educated women are often found working in the public sector in the 
Scandinavian welfare states. Job security is higher than in the private sector, human capital seems to 
have a higher rate of return and the public sector may offer better opportunities to find subsidized 
childcare facilities. On the other hand, in the private sector, wages are more dispersed and hours are 
less regulated. We should thus expect that stronger incentives to work, like higher wages or lower 
marginal tax rates, may have an impact on the sectoral choice of working women. Higher wages, in 
particular in the private sector, or lower marginal tax rates, may give women an incentive to shift labor 
supply away from the public towards the private sector. A typical example is a part-time nurse or a 
medical doctor in a public hospital who shifts her labor supply to a private clinic with longer working 
hours. However, the income of the spouse may affect the choice of the wife and it also matters that 
matching in the marriage market is not random. Typically, a woman with a high potential wage in the 
market is married to a man with similar opportunities. 
 Our analysis shows that the sharp reductions in marginal tax rates in the 1992 tax reform 
stimulates overall labor supply to some extent, and it gives married women an incentive to move from 
the public to the private sector where hours are less constrained and wage dispersion is higher. Despite 
the fact that labor supply increases, which enlarges the tax base, tax revenues are reduced. The 
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calculation of the mean value of the change in household welfare (CV) that follows from the 1992 tax 
reform shows that the rich gained far more than did the poor. 
 A central feature of our labor supply model is that in addition to leisure and disposable income, 
“job type” is an important decision variable. Type of job and other nonpecuniary job attributes may 
matter a great deal for the chosen labor market affiliation of the individuals. Some jobs may be more 
interesting and challenging than other jobs. To change working load within this setup, one has to 
change job; see Altonji and Paxson (1988) for findings that support this view. Type of job may matter 
for labor supply responses when tax systems are changed, as the more interesting and challenging a 
job is, the less important may be the net wage (above a certain level). Those who have these types of 
jobs are not randomly chosen in the population; they tend to be well educated, with high wage 
incomes, and their spouse may also fit the same characteristics. This kind of behavior may have strong 
implications for how tax rules should be changed to stimulate labor supply. Improved economic 
incentives should be targeted towards those who respond, not necessarily towards those with the 
highest education and income levels, who face the highest marginal tax rates. Although most job 
attributes are unobserved, this alternative point of departure has important implications for the 
empirical modeling framework, and accordingly for how the evaluation of tax reforms (the calculation 
of compensating variation) should be performed. A particularly important feature of this framework is 
that it allows for a new way of interpreting and dealing with quantity constraints in the labor market. 
Typically, data on hours of work show peaks at full-time and possibly part-time hours of work 
(typically 50 and 25 percent of a full-time job). Within our approach, this is explained as stemming 
from institutional regulations that yield more jobs with full-time or part-time hours of work than jobs 
with other hours of work.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is explained briefly and in a 
more pedagogical way than in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). Empirical specifications and discussion of 
estimates are given in Section 3. Section 4 reports labor supply elasticities. In Sections 5 and 6, the 
implications of two tax reforms are analyzed. Section 7 concludes.  
II. The model 
In this section we give a very brief outline of the modelling framework with reference to 
married/cohabiting women. For more detail and empirical analysis we refer to Dagsvik and Strøm 
(2006). 
 The labor supply and hence the wage income of the husband is assumed exogenously given.  
The household is assumed to derive utility from household consumption, here set equal to household 
disposable income, leisure and nonpecuniary attributes of jobs. Let z = 1, 2,…, be an indexation of the 
jobs and let z  = 0 represent not working. The utility function is assumed to have the form 
, for z = 0, 1, 2,…, where , indexes the sectors and j = 0 if z = 0, 
and v(·) is a positive deterministic function. The terms { are positive sector-and job-specific 
random taste shifters. The taste shifter accounts for unobserved individual characteristics and 
unobserved job-specific attributes. These taste shifters {  are assumed to be i.i.d. across jobs, 
sectors and agents, with c.d.f. 
( ) ( ), , , , ( )jU C h j z v C h zε= 1,2=j
( )}j zε
( )}j zε ,
exp( 1/ ),x−  for positive x. The reason why the index z enters the utility 
function is that job-specific attributes beyond wage and hours of work may affect the utility of the 
agents.  
 For given hours of work h and wage rate w, disposable household income is given by 
(1) , ( ),C f hw I=
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where f(·) is a function that transforms pre-tax incomes into after-tax incomes. The pre-tax incomes 
are the wage income of the married female (hw) and three nonlabor income components included in 
the vector I. These three incomes are the wage income of the husband, the capital income of the 
household and child allowances, which vary with the number of children up to the age of 18. Child 
allowances are not taxed. All details of the tax structure are taken into account in the estimation and 
simulation of the model. The tax functions of wage income in 1994, as well as child allowances, are 
given in Appendix B. From there, we note that the tax functions differ depending on whether both 
spouses are working. Capital income is taxed at a flat rate of 0.28. 
  The agent is assumed to face two mean wage rates (mean across sector-specific jobs), w1 and 
w2, specific to each sector. For notational simplicity, let Furthermore, let  be 
the probability of choosing sector j and hours of work h (for an utility maximizing agent), and let D be 
the set of feasible hours (assumed to be the same across sectors). In Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) it is 
demonstrated that 
1 2( , ).=w w w ( )| ,j h w Iϕ
(2) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )2
1 0,
( , , ( )
| ,
(0, ,0 ( , , ( )
)
) )
= > ∈
=
+ 
j j j
j
k k
k x x D
v f hw I h g h
h w I
v f I v f xw I x g x
θ
ϕ
θk
, 
for  , and 0,>h 1,2=j
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for  where 0,h = ( )jg h  denotes the fraction of available jobs in sector j (available to the agent) with 
hours of work h. The term θj is a job opportunity index, representing the total amount of job 
opportunities available to the agent in sector j, j =1,2. The job opportunity index may also capture 
the effect of unobserved fixed cost of working. In the absence of fixed cost, unobserved preference 
effects for working versus not working, and no difference between job opportunities across sectors 
 Otherwise, we expect to be less than one. The case with θj = 1 and gk(h);k=1,2, being 
uniform, is the one that resembles the most conventional approach with no fixed cost and no 
restrictions on the set of available jobs. This is rather evident because this specification means that 
there are no systematic differences in the available jobs and with no fixed cost nor preferences effects 
for working versus not working are present.  
jθ
1.=jθ jθ
 A difficult issue is how the equilibrium opportunity densities{ ( )}j jg hθ are determined.  
However, since we in this context are only focused on the simulation of pure supply effects it makes 
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sence to condition on the opportunity densities. In other words, this means that we condition on given 
wage rates and (distribution of) opportunity sets of jobs.   
III. Empirical specification and estimation results 
The choice set of offered hours is assumed to be represented by seven intervals. The medians of the 
intervals range from 315 annual hours to 2600 annual hours and are given by 
{ }0, 315, 780,1040,1560,1976, 2340, 2600=D . The midpoints in the intervals for part-time and full-
time jobs are 1040 and 1976 annual hours, respectively. When estimating the model given in (3) and 
(4), we face two problems. First, sector j wage rates are observed only for those who work in sector j. 
Second, wage rates may be endogenous in the sense that they may be correlated with the taste shifters. 
To deal with these issues, sector-specific wage equations are estimated and used as instrument 
variables. In the wage equations, log wage rates are specified as a linear function of experience 
(defined as age minus years of education and minus six), experience squared and education level. For 
further discussion on the specification and estimation of the wage equations we refer to Dagsvik and 
Strøm (2006). Subsequently, the sector-specific wage rates in the model are replaced by the respective 
estimated wage equations, with the error terms added. As the wage equations contains these random 
error terms, we must take the expectation of the choice probabilities (2) and (3) with respect to these 
error terms. The aggregate wage elasticities and the expected value of compensating variation are all 
expected values with expectation taken with respect to the random parts of the wage equations. In 
practise, the random variables in the choice probabilities are integrated out through simulations. 
 The logarithm of the job opportunity index θj is assumed to be a linear function of length of 
schooling. The densities of offered hours  are assumed to be uniform, apart from peaks 
at typical full-time and part-time hours. This accounts for the fact that there are more jobs available in 
the labor market with part-time hours and full-time hours. The structure of the deterministic part of the 
utility function is assumed to be of a particular Box–Cox type, see Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). We 
assume a unitary labor supply model which implies “income pooling”. 
( ), 1,2,=jg h j
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 The estimates of the structural model are reported in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). We refer to this 
paper for a discussion of these results as well as extensions allowing for random effects, while in 
Table 1 report how the predicted choice probabilities vary with socioeconomic characteristics. The 
probability of not working decreases with age and education, and it sharply increases with the number 
of children. The older the woman and the lower her level of education is, the more likely it is that she 
works in the private sector. 
 The probability of working in the public sector is remarkably similar across varying numbers of 
children. In contrast, the probability of working in the private sector declines rather strongly with the 
number of children. These findings accord well with widely held conjectures that childcare facilities 
and leave with pay at the time of giving birth are more easily available in the public sector than in the 
private. Unfornuately, we do not observe variables at an individual level that may represent childcare 
facilities and parental pay. 
Table 1. Choice probabilities and their variation with socioeconomic variables for married 
women, Norway, 1994. Per cent 
Variables Not working Public sector Private sector 
Age range: 
25–34 10.45 47.32 42.33 
35–44   7.75 49.05 43.20 
43–64   6.80 44.71 48.49 
Number of children: 
0   4.89 46.02 49.09 
1   6.18 48.88 44.94 
2 10.09 46.76 43.15 
More than 2 16.79 47.03 36.18 
Education: 
Less than 9 years   9.71 27.54 62.74 
Intermediate   9.05 43.42 47.52 
High, 15–17 years   4.42 73.27 22.31 
 
 Table 2 provides predictions of the conditional expectations of hours and their variation with 
socioeconomic characteristics. Expected hours, given working, are predicted to vary little across ages. 
They drop sharply in both sectors when the household has two or more children. Of particular interest 
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is the prediction of how hours vary with education in the two sectors. In the public sector, hours 
increase slightly with years of education, whereas in the private sector, the highly educated women are 
predicted to work rather long hours. As mentioned above, highly educated women tend to prefer the 
public rather than the private sector, but those who do work in the private sector work long hours.  
 Although our estimates indicate that human capital has higher return in the public sector, we 
should keep in mind that hours are less regulated in the private sector and wage dispersion is higher. 
Examples of well-paid women working long hours in the private sector are women in leading 
management positions and female doctors working in private clinics rather than in public hospitals. 
The question is whether improvements in job opportunities like higher wages, lower taxes and less 
regulated hours will move more women with high education from the public sector to the private 
sector. These are some of the issues that we discuss in the next sections.  
Table 2. Conditional expectations of annual hours and their variation with socioeconomic vari-
ables for married women, Norway, 1994 
Variables Public sector Private sector 
Age range: 
25–34 1530 1576 
35–44 1571 1631 
43–64 1598 1608 
Number of children: 
0 1689 1694 
1 1627 1662 
2 1490 1530 
More than 2 1310 1363 
Education: 
Less than 9 years 1535 1531 
Intermediate 1552 1604 
High, 15–17 years 1607 1768 
IV. Elasticities 
In Tables 3–5, we report uncompensated wage elasticities in labor supply among married women 
when the hourly wage rates are increased. The choice probabilities related to sectors and hours are 
used to calculate these elasticities. We have used stochastic simulation to calculate the expectation of 
the choice probabilities with respect to the error terms in the wage equations. The marginal effects are 
calculated for each individual and thereafter aggregated, and subsequently the corresponding 
elasticities are calculated. We term them aggregate elasticities. They measure the elasticities of 
aggregate labor supply (participation, expected hours worked) with respect to the wage rates. 
 In practice, the choice probabilities are computed by stochastic simulation as follows. Let rjw  be 
given by the wage equation of sector j as 
(4) log r rj j jw X jβ σ η= +  
where  are independent draws from . If M is large , 1,2,..., ,rj rη = M ( )0,1N
(5) ( ) ( )
1
1| | , ;
M
r
j j
r
h I h w I j
M
ϕ ϕ
=
≅ =% 0,1,2
                                                     
 
where .  ( )1 2,r r rw w w=
An overall wage increase and overall labor supply 
The first column of Table 3 defines the categories for which the elasticities are calculated. The second 
column gives the elasticities of the probabilities of working, working in the public sector and working 
in the private sector. For simplicity, we term these elasticities the working sector elasticities. The next 
column gives the elasticities of hours of work, given that the individual works either in the public 
sector or in the private sector. The last column gives the elasticities of the unconditional expectation of 
labor supply with respect to wage rate changes.1 
  From Table 3, we note that an overall wage increase implies an elasticity with respect to 
working (in any sector) of 0.27. The elasticity of hours supplied, conditional on working, is slightly 
higher, 0.35, which means that the aggregate elasticity of labor supply in the population of married 
1 The last column is approximately equal to the sum of the preceding columns. The equality is not exact due to aggregation. 
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 annually (the upper bound of annual hours of work 
assumed in the estimation of the model).   
ffect 
nditional expected hours is considerably higher and 
imila
 
 sector, and to 
nd jo
ly. 
s labor supply. We observe that the elasticity is estimated to be 0.69, 
which is clearly less than 1. 
ed. 
at 
higher intersector wage elasticities. An increase in wage rates in the public sector gives women an 
females in Norway in 1994 sums up to around 0.64. The reason for the rather “low” participation 
elasticity relative to hours of work elasticity compared with the results from most other countries is 
due to the fact that labor market participation of married women was very high in 1994 and still is.  
 In the long run hours of work elasticities with respect to wage rates will also decrease as c
hours of work increase towards 3640 hours
An overall wage increase and sectoral responses 
The sector dimension introduced here plays a novel role in how increased wage rates may a
behavior. From Table 3 we observe that, in the public sector, the wage elasticity related to 
participation is very low. The elasticity of co
s r to the elasticity in the private sector. 
 In the private sector the elasticity of the choice probability is much higher than in the public 
sector. A higher chance of finding jobs with longer working hours and higher wage levels may be the
reason why women would like to shift their labor supply from the public to the private
fi bs with longer working hours, when there is an overall increase in wage rates. 
 We also report the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to an overall increase in wage rates. Tax 
revenues are increased for two reasons. A higher wage rate yields higher earnings, given labor supp
A higher wage rate stimulate
A wage increase in the public sector only 
In Table 4, we report the wage elasticities when only the wage rate in the public sector is increas
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we observe that the effects on overall labor supply are considerably 
weaker when the wage rates in the public sector only are increased. The most important result is th
the modest wage elasticities related to work in any sector (overall labor supply) shadow for much 
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incentive to move from the private to the public sector. Hours of work, given the sector, are only 
affected to a much minor extent. 
A wage increase in the private sector only 
The same pattern emerges when the wage rates in the private sector only are increased, as shown in 
Table 5.  
Table 3. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to an overall wage increase in the 
public and the private sector. Married Norwegian females, 1994 
  
Mean Working  
Sector 
Mean conditional  
expected hours 
Mean unconditional  
expected hours 
  Probability  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities
ALL 
(Private and Public) 92.10 0.274 1594 0.353 1468 0.637 
PUBLIC 46.68 0.084 1574 0.365 735 0.453 
PRIVATE 45.42 0.469 1616 0.335 734 0.821 
Tax revenue      0.69 
 
Table  4. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to a wage increase in the public 
sector. Married Norwegian females, 1994 
  
Mean Working  
Sector 
Mean conditional  
expected hours 
Mean unconditional  
expected hours 
  Probability  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities
ALL 
(Private and Public) 92.10 0.15 1594 0.183 1468 0.34 
PUBLIC 46.68 1.55 1574 0.329 735 1.93 
PRIVATE 45.42 -1.29 1616 0.034 734 -1.26 
 
Table 5. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to a wage increase in the private 
sector. Married Norwegian females, 1994 
  
Mean Working  
Sector 
Mean conditional  
expected hours 
Mean unconditional  
expected hours 
  Probability  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities
ALL 
(Private and Public) 92.10 0.158 1594 0.210 1468 0.372 
PUBLIC 46.68 -1.430 1574 0.036 735 -1.399 
PRIVATE 45.42 1.790 1616 0.300 734 2.144 
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 The elasticities given here must be interpreted as predictions of long term supply effects and do 
not  say anything about the time needed for the full outcome of the wage change to be reached, condi-
tional on constant sets of job opportunities. This will depend on the serial correlation in the random 
taste-shifters of the utility functions. For example, the present one period model is consistent with the 
two following extreme interpretations: in the first one the taste-shifters are serially uncorrelated, 
whereas in the second case they are time constant random effects. In the first case there will be a flow 
of persons that over time adjusts their labor supply responses due to new random draws of their taste-
shifters. In the other case, the taste-shifters are fixed and consequently there will be no adjustments 
beyond the immediate response, due to changes in unobservables. With appropriate panel data one 
could model and estimate the corresponding transition probabilities. This issue is however far beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
 Income elasticities can easily be calculated, but they will be of no use in the calculation of the 
compensated Hicks elasticities. The reason is that with a random utility model the Slutsky equation in 
the traditional sense does not exist. Indifference curves are replaced by indifference bands and quan-
tites by probabilities. The calculation of compensated elasticities will soon be available in another 
paper. 
V. Labor-supply effects of tax reforms 
In 1992, the Norwegian tax system was reformed, with a move towards lower and less progressive tax 
rates. In subsequent years, the tax structure remained virtually unchanged. Therefore, to assess the 
effects on labor supply we have chosen to focus on 1991, the year prior to the tax reform, and a post 
reform year, 1994. 
 The tax rates on labor incomes in these years are set out in Appendix B, and we observe that the 
1992 reform considerably reduced the top marginal tax rate from 0.654 to 0.495, but also other tax 
rates were changed. To assess the labor supply responses to this reform, we have employed our model 
to simulate the labor supply among married women. Because the 1992 reform was a move towards 
less progressive taxes, we have also used the model to simulate the impact on labor supply of 
14 
                                                     
replacing the 1994 tax system with a flat and revenue-neutral tax system. The results are reported in 
Table 8. Note that when taxes are changed, this also implies a change in the taxation of the wage 
income of the spouse. 
 In our model, when the 1991 tax regime is replaced by the 1994 tax regime, we get an increase 
in labor market participation from 88.6 per cent to 92.1 per cent. There is a slight reduction in public 
sector participation, but there is a considerable increase in participation in the private sector. Thus, the 
labor supply effects of the tax reform of 1992 imply that married women are given a stronger incentive 
to find work outside home and to work in the private sector2. Given participation in any sector, the 
expected hours of work increase by around 127 hours per year (1594-1467). The increase in expected 
conditional working hours is higher for women working in the private sector than in the public sector. 
Despite the fact that labor supply is stimulated by the reform, tax revenue goes down. The reason is 
that lower tax rates have a negative effect on tax revenue, which outweighs the positive effect on tax 
revenue from the increase in labor supply. Thus the tax reform is under-financed.  
 In order to demonstrate the effects on labor supply when the 1992 tax reform is not under-
financed we have multiplied the tax rates after the 1992 tax reform with a constant. The progressive 
tax structure of the 1992 reform is thus preserved. The constant is determined through simulations on 
the model so that the tax revenue is the same as in 1991. The constant is calculate to be 1.2, which 
means that all tax rates under the 1992 reform are raised by 20%.Table 8a shows the labor supply 
effects of this hypothetical tax structure. Comparing Tables 8 and 8a we observe that a tax revenue 
neutral version of the 1992 tax reform yields rather modest changes in overall labor supply. However, 
the shift of labor market participation towards the private sector and with longer working hours in the 
private is also now present. It should be emphasized that the 1992 tax reform that we analyze here was 
under-financed, which shift the tax burden towards future generations. To fully account for the inpact 
of future tax burdens on current labor supply is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be 
remembered that Norway is a petro-economy with huge funds, based on the cash-flow from the sale of 
2 Data shows that participation among married and single women working in the private sector increased from 45.3 percent in 
1993 to 49.1 percent in 1999. 
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oil and gas, invested abroad. This might have an impact on the willingness of the politicians to 
undertake reforms that are not fully financed. 
 The 1992 tax reform achieved what the government at the time wanted: labor supply was 
stimulated and in particular the incentives to encourage individuals to work in the private sector. 
 We also consider the hypotothetical effects of a flat tax. Based on the empirical model we find 
that a flat tax of 29 per cent on all incomes is found to yield the same tax revenue as the 1994 tax 
system. By introducing a hypothetical, but potential doable, flat tax system, the labor supply responses 
to the 1992 tax reform would be reinforced. There is a slight increase in overall participation, and 
there is a further shift in participation away from the public sector towards the private sector. Working 
hours are predicted to increase further, in particular in the private sector.  
 In Table 9 we report how choice probabilities vary with socioeconomic characteristics under the 
three tax strucures considered here. A striking result is that women with higher education, and hence 
with a stronger incentive to exploit the wage dispersion and wage level in the private sector when 
taxes are cut, increase their participation in the private sector at the expense of participating in the 
public sector. For the higher educated women public sector participation is predicted to go down from 
76.41% to 73.27 % and the private sector participation is predicted to go up from 16.75% to 22.31%. 
We note that the flat tax system reinforces the labor supply effects of the 1992 tax reform. When 
grouped according to ages and number of children we predict a shift towards the private sector at the 
expense of participating in the public sector, with the exception for women with more than two 
children.  
 Table 10 reports the mean of expected hours, conditional on working in the public or the private 
sector, and grouped according to socioeconomic characteristics. The most notable result is the large 
increase in hours worked in the private sector by women with the highest education level in response 
to the 1992 tax reforms. 
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Table 8. Labor supply responses to the tax reform of 1992 and to a flat tax of 0.29 
  Mean working probabilities, 
percent 
Mean Conditional expected 
annual hours 
Mean Unconditional expected 
annual hours 
  1991 1994 Flat tax 1991 1994 Flat tax 1991 1994 Flat tax 
All sectors  
(Public and 
private) 
88.58 92.10 93.15 1467 1594 1709 1299 1468 1592 
Public sector 47.17 46.68 44.60 1479 1574 1652 697 735 737 
Private sector 41.42 45.42 48.55 1453 1616 1762 602 734 855 
Mean tax revenue  
Mill 1994 NOK       130 113 113 
 
Table 8 A. Labor supply responses to the tax reform of 1992 with neutral revenue  
(Tax revenue: 130 Mill 1994 NOK as in 1991 tax system ) 
  
Mean working  
probabilities, 
percent 
Mean Conditional 
expected annual  
hours 
Mean Unconditional  
expected annual  
hours 
All sectors  
(public and private) 89.08 1505 1340 
Public sector 46.67 1496 698 
Private sector 42.41 1514 642 
 
 
Table 9. Choice probabilities and their variation with socioeconomic variables. Per cent 
1991 tax system 1994 tax system Flat tax of 29% 
Variable Not 
working 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Not 
working 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Not 
working 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Age range                
25–34 14.43 47.56 38.01 10.45 47.32 42.23 10.12 45.06 44.82 
35–44 11.19 49.71 39.10 7.75 49.05 43.20 7.24 46.32 46.43 
43–64 9.90 45.27 44.83 6.80 44.71 48.49 7.44 41.79 50.77 
Number of 
children          
0 7.31 47.27 45.42 4.89 46.02 49.09 5.55 42.92 51.53 
1 9.11 50.03 40.86 6.18 48.88 44.94 5.39 46.42 48.20 
2 14.39 46.62 38.99 10.09 46.76 43.15 9.71 44.39 45.90 
more than 2  22.37 45.71 31.92 16.79 47.03 36.18 16.75 44.67 38.57 
Woman’s          
17 
education 
low (≤9 
years) 13.37 26.54 60.09 9.71 27.54 62.74 8.90 27.48 63.62 
Intermediate  
(10–13 
years) 
12.82 43.46 43.72 9.05 43.42 47.52 9.24 41.19 49.57 
High (15–
17 years) 6.84 76.41 16.75 4.42 73.27 22.31 3.98 67.37 28.65 
 
Table 10. Conditional expected annual hours under different tax rate systems by several vari-
ables and ranges 
1991 tax system 1994 tax system Flat tax of 29% 
Variable Public sec-
tor 
Private 
sector 
Public sec-
tor 
Private 
sector 
Public sec-
tor 
Private 
sector 
Age range          
25–34 1465 1434 1530 1576 1589 1706 
35–44 1470 1462 1571 1631 1656 1785 
43–64 1481 1438 1598 1608 1695 1764 
Number of children       
0 1587 1528 1689 1694 1775 1843 
1 1533 1496 1627 1662 1699 1806 
2 1393 1369 1490 1530 1569 1677 
more than 2  1215 1215 1310 1363 1399 1523 
Woman’s education       
low (≤9 years) 1455 1406 1535 1531 1605 1642 
Intermediate  
(10–13 years) 1464 1446 1552 1604 1628 1747 
High (15–17 years) 1494 1531 1607 1768 1702 1968 
 
VI. Compensating variation 
To further evaluate the 1992 tax reform, we calculate the change in household welfare. One way to do 
this is to apply the measure of Compensating Variation (CV). The calculation of CV is not 
straightforward in a random utility model when utility is not linear in household income. A random 
utility function implies that CV is also random. A general treatment of this issue was undertaken by 
Dagsvik and Karlstrom (2005). In order to bring out the essentials of their approach we shall first go 
through the argument in a somewhat simplified, but general, setting in the next subsection. 
 The Random Expenditure Function in Random Utility Models 
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jAssume that the utility function has the structure  where j jU (f , y) (f , y) ,= κ ε (.)jκ is a deterministic 
term, as a function of prices and tax system f and income y, and jε is a positive random term. The 
random terms }{ jε are supposed independent of the deterministic terms { }.jκ  The index j indicates 
discrete alternative j.  
Now suppose that the prices and/or the tax system changes from regime  (regime zero) to 
(regime 1). Let , j= 0, 1, denote the income under regime respectively. Then the 
corresponding Compensating Variation, CV, is defined implicitly as the value that solves 
0f
,f jy ,,0 ff
(6)   ).,(max),(max 100 CVyfUyfU kkkk −=
From this definition it follows that the CV measure becomes a random variable that may depend on all 
random terms }.{ jε  This is due to the fact that the maximum of the left hand side in (6) will not be 
attained at the same discrete alternative as the maximum of the right hand side of (6), except in special 
cases. Consequently, the random terms on each side will not cancel. We shall now proceed to review 
the main argument that yields the c.d.f. of the CV. To this end we first define the indirect utility 
function V(f,y) by  
    ).,(max),( yfUyfV kk=
Moreover, define the expenditure function Y(f, u) in the usual way by for given 
positive utility level u. Furthermore, define the choice index as the index of the highest utility, 
that is, the utility of the chosen alternative, given (f, y). For notational simplicity, let 
and  Consider the event 
 This is the event that the regime 1 expenditure, given the initial utility level, is 
greater than y. Evidently, we have that  Moreover, notice that 
,)),(,( uufYfV =
),y ),,( 000 yfUU jj =
).,( 00 yfJ
}.0V≤
),( yfJ
,() fV=
0J =
),({ yfV
0 0
j j jm (y) max( (f , y ), (f , y)),= κ κ
),,()( yfUyU jj = ,(
000 yfjj κκ =
}.),({ 0 yVfY ≥
),,( 00
0 yfVV =
()(), fy jj κκ =
}),({ 0 yVfY ≥
(yV
), y
⇔
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),) 00 iJyV =≥
when alternative i is chosen initially and regime 1 expenditure at utility level  is higher than y, then 
which is equivalent to  Hence, we get  
0V
k
y)ε
),(0 yUU ii ≥
(( fYP
( 0VP=
( 0UP i=
P(= κ
),/1exp( x−
,(( fYP
.)( 0ii y κκ >
)(( 0VyVP ≤
max), 0 kiU ≥
max), 0Uy kik≠
0 0
k i i), (y)))ε κ ≥ κ
(7)    ),),), 000 iJiJyV ===≥
 
  
)(max 00 kikki UyUU ≠≥=
),(max(max 0UU ikik ≥≥ ≠
))max),(max(max( 00 kikki UyUUP ≠≥=
))(0 yU i
  i i k i kmax (m (y)≠ε ≥
0
i i k i k kP( max (m ( ).≠= κ ε ≥
 
Assume now that the random error terms are (type I) extreme value distributed with c.d.f. 
for positive x. Then it follows from (7) and well known results, that 
 
(8)     =
0
0
i i kmax ≠κ ε ≥ ii k k 0
k i
P( (m (y) )) .
)
≠
κ
ε =
κ +i km (y  
 
Let  be defined by i ( ) .=iy
0
ικ
iy=
0
iV ) y≤
iy κ
=≥ ))0 yV 0
 Then the agent will not switch from the initially chosen alternative, 
 if Y( , the reason being that utilities in regimes 0 and 1 are equal.  Clearly, one 
must have that  , because  otherwise the utility of alternative i will exceed ex post. 
Hence the relation in (8) is valid for  Let  if  
,0 iJ = f
,(( fYP
0,V )
Y(f , 0iU
.iyy ≤
≥ JyVf ,), 0
( ) 1=jR y ,)(
0
jj y κκ ≤
(that is, when and zero otherwise. Then from (8) it follows immediately that the c.d.f of the 
expenditure function is determined by 
),iyy ≤
(Y ), 0Vf
(9)  =
i
iYP )(( ) .
( )
= 
0
i k+ m
i
i 0
i
k¹i
κR (y κ y  
 Note furthermore, that the two first moment of a random variable Y distributed on , 
with c.d.f. F(y) can be expressed as  
),[ ∞−a
(10)   ,))(1( adyyFEY
a
−−= ∞
−
and 
(11)    .))(1(2 22 adyyFyEY
a
+−= ∞
−
The proof of (10) and (11) is straightforward. Hence, from (9) and (10) it follows that the mean 
expenditure is given by 
(12)  
( )( )
( ) ( )
∞   
iy0 0
0 i i i
0 0
i ii k i k-a -a
k¹i k¹i
R y κ dy κ dyEY f,V = - a = - a,κ + h y κ + h y  
provided the expenditure function is distributed on for some positive a. Similarly, 
one can compute the second order moment and the variance of the expenditure function by using (11). 
Finally, from the definition in (6) we realize that  
),( 0VfY ),,[ ∞−a
1 CVy − ,),( 0VfY =
which yields 
(13)    ).,( 01 VfEYyECV −=
Calculation of the distribution of CV in our model 
As we have seen in the previous section, the method of Dagsvik and Karlstrom (2005) provides 
convenient formulas for calculating mean and higher order moments of CV for observationally 
homogeneous populations. We shall now adapt this method to the more complicated case of our 
model. In our case we do not have an observational homogeneous population and we also need to 
consider aggregation across different population subgroups. Let E[CV|X] denotes the conditional mean 
CV, given individual characteristics X.  Furthermore, let EVar(CV|X) and VarE(CV|X), denote two 
types of conditional variances of CV. The first variance measures the average variance of CV within 
observational identical population groups, whereas the second variance measures the variation in 
expected CV across observationally identical groups. 
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 Let us next proceed with analysing CV in the context of this paper. With the notation introduced 
earlier, define 
(14) , ( ) ( )( )
( )
, , , max , , ,
j
j j jz B h
V h w I f U f hw I h z
∈
=
%
where ( )jB h is the set of available jobs in sector j with hours of work h. The term  is the 
conditional indirect utility, given hours of work h in sector j, wage rate wj, nonlabor income I and tax 
system f. Furthermore, the assumptions about the utility function imply that 
( ), , ,j jV h w I f%
(15)  . ( ) ( )
( )
, , , , , max ( )
j
j j j jz B h
V h w I f h w I zψ ε
∈
=
%
where j j(h, w , I) v(f (hw , I), h).ψ =  
Owing to the fact that the random taste shifters are extreme value distributed, it follows that we can 
write 
(16) , 
( )
max ( ) ( ) ( )
j
j j j jz B h
dz g hε θ ε
∈
= % h
where  denotes equality in distribution and  has c.d.f. d= ( )j hε% ( )exp 1 , 0x x− >
0
. Moreover, , 
, , are independent. (Recall that we use the convention that  implies .) 
As a result, we can express the conditional indirect utility as 
( )j hε%
0j =0,j = 1,2 0,1,...h = 0h =
(17)  ( ) ( ), , , , , ( ) ( )j j j j j jV h w I f h w I g h hψ θ ε=% %
for ,  and 0h > 1,2,j =
(18)  ( ) ( ) ( )0 00, , , 0,0, , 0,0, (0)jV w I f V I f Iψ ε≡ =% % %
for  0.h =
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 For notational simplicity, let  for  and 
. Let  be the unconditional indirect utility, defined 
as 
( ) ( ), , , , ( )j j j j jV h w I h w I g hψ θ=
( )0,0, I= ( ), ,V w I f%
0h >
( ) ( )0 00, , , 0,0, ,jV w I f V I f ψ≡
(19) . ( ) ( ) ( )0 1,2 0,, , max 0,0, , ,max max , , ,j h h D j jV w I f V I f V h w I f= > ∈ =  % % %
Analogously to (15) we realize that CV (for an individual), is defined implicitly through 
(20) , ( ) ( )0, , , ,= −V w I f V w I CV f% %
where 0f denotes the initial budget constraint and f denotes the budget constraint after the tax reform. 
In Dagsvik and Karlström (2005), it is demonstrated that the distribution of Y I  is given by CV≡ −
(21) ( )
( ) ( )0, , , ,
( )
∈> =
  j j j
j h D
R h y V h w I f
P Y y
K y
, 
where 
  ( ) ( ) ( )01 if , , , , , ,,
0 otherwise,
 <
= 
j j j j
j
V h w y f V h w I f
R h y
and 
(22) . ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )20 0
1 0
( ) max 0,0, , , 0,0, , max , , , , , , ,
= >
= +  j j j j
j h
K y I f y f V h w I f V h w y fψ ψ
The difference between the case considered here and the treatment in Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) is 
that, in their case, Y is positive whereas in the present case, Y can attain negative values. However, the 
formulas in (10) and (11) can be applied. From (21), (22) and (10) it follows that the individual mean 
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CV, conditional on wage rates, nonlabor income and other characteristics (suppressed in the notation 
below) is given by 
(23) [ ] ( ) ( )2 0
1 0
( ) (0)
| , , , , 0,0, ,
( ) ( )
= >
− −
= − = + − −   
j
j j
j h
y h y
a a
dy dyE CV w I I EY I a V h w I f I f
K y K y
ψ  
where  yj(h) and y(0) are defined by 
(24) , ( ) ( )0, , , , , ( ),=j j j j jV h w I f V h w y h f
and 
(25) . ( ) ( )00,0, , 0,0, (0),=V I f V y f
Furthermore, (21), (22) and (11) yield 
(26) [ ] [ ] ( )
= >
−
= = +  
j2
2 0
j j
j 1 h 0
y ( h )
a
ydyVar CV | w,I Var Y | w,I a 2 V h,w ,I , f
K( y )
  
 ( ) [ ]( )
−
+ − 2
y( 0 )
a
ydy2 0,0,I , f E Y | w,I .
K( y )
ψ  
It is important to emphasize that the formulas in (23) and (26) give the mean CV and variance of CV 
conditional on wage rates, nonlabor income and other individual (observed) characteristics. The next 
step is to compute the conditional mean and variance of CV given nonlabor income, education and the 
demographic variables that enter the model, i.e., the mean is taken with respect to the random wage 
rates. This is done by drawing independent error terms from the standard normal distribution and 
thereafter inserting these error terms into the wage equations. This yields a set of random wage rates 
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)
for each woman. From these simulated wage rates, one can compute (simulate) the conditional 
mean, ( |E CV I  given nonlabor income and other individual characteristics, by taking the expectation 
with respect to the wage rates distribution for each woman. Below, we report the mean and spread in 
the population. 
 
Table 11. Expected value of compensating variation, an estimate of the welfare changes for 
households from the 1992 tax reform. NOK 1994, with the 1991 tax system used as a 
reference against the 1994 tax system 
  
E(CV) 
E(CV) in percent of 
observed disposable 
income*  
All 27078 11.46 
Deciles in the distribution of household disposable income*:   
1 (poor) 6761 4.32 
2–9 (middle) 24896 11.11 
10 (rich) 64150 16.66 
* Decile(s) refers to the deciles in the distribution of disposable income, 1994  
 The standard deviations related to EVar(CV|X) and VarE(CV|X) are calculated to NOK 56000 
and NOK 19429, respectively. Thus, the spread in the distribution of E[CV|X] is large, with the spread 
within groups exceeding the spread across groups. 
Figure 1. Population density of expected Compensating Variation. Distribution of E(CV), com-
paring the 1991 tax regime against the 1994 tax regime 
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  From Table 11, we observe that the mean household in the sample gained NOK 27078 from 
the 1992 tax reform. The richest household gained almost 10 times more than the poorest or 4 times 
more in relative income terms. The reason why is the sharp reduction in the tax rate at the top, from 
65.4 percent in 1991 to 49.5 percent after the tax reform. Thus richest households thus got a 
considerable increase in disposable income, even with no change in their labor supply.  The 
distribution of expected gain across households is given in Figure 1, and we observe that most of the 
households will benefit from the 1992 tax reform. Thus, such a reform would have attained support 
from a clear majority of households with married and cohabiting women at an election. 
 We have also calculated the expected value of compensating variation of a flat tax reform. In 
the calculations, the tax-revenue-neutral flat tax reform of 29% is used as a reference. Negative values 
mean that the numerical values have to be subtracted from household incomes under the flat tax 
regime in order to make the households indifferent in welfare terms between the 1994 regime and the 
flat tax regime. Table 12 then says that, on average, the households will gain NOK 51528 if there is a 
shift from the 1994 tax regime to a flat tax regime. The richest households gain around 8 times more 
than the poorest. Thus, in a distributional sense, the richest household benefited more from having the 
1991 regime replaced with the 1994 tax regime than they would have in the case of a shift from the 
1994 tax regime to a flat tax regime. In Figure 2, we show the population density of the individual 
25 
mean CV. We observe that a vast majority will benefit from the replacement of the 1994 tax regime 
with a flat tax regime. 
Table 9. Expected value of compensating variation, an estimate of the welfare changes for 
households from a flat tax reform. NOK 1994, with a flat tax regime used as a refer-
ence against the 1994 tax regime 
 E(CV) 
All –51437  
Deciles in the distribution of household disposable income, flat tax: 
1 (poor) –17155  
2–9 (middle) –53093  
10 (rich) –146966  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Population density of expected Compensating Variation. Distribution of E(CV), with 
the flat tax system of 29% used as a reference against the 1994 tax regime 
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VII. Conclusion 
The labor supply model for married and cohabiting women, developed by Dagsvik and Strøm and 
estimated on Norwegian data from 1994, has been used in selected simulation experiments. Some of 
these experiments illustrate the effect of changes in wage rates and the distribution of offered hours, 
whereas others illustrate the effect of a tax reform. The overall elasticities are much smaller than 
elasticities related to sectoral responses. 
 The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 implied a considerable reduction in the top marginal tax rate, 
but the tax rates in lower brackets were also reduced. We find that the impact on overall labor supply 
is rather modest, but again these modest changes shadow for stronger sectoral changes. The tax reform 
stimulated the married women to shift their labor from the public to the private sector and to work 
longer hours. We have applied the methodology of Dagsvik and Karlstrøm (2005) to calculate the 
expected value of the compensating variation with the framework of a random utility model. This 
calculation of the expected value of changes in household welfare demonstrated that the richest 
households benefited far more from the tax reform than the poorest household. Thus there is a trade 
off between efficiency and equity as also found in Paulus and Peichl (2008). However, as shown 
above, most households gained from the reform. 
 A flat tax reform, with the same tax revenue as in 1994, would reinforce the labor supply 
responses of the 1992 reform. In relative terms, the richest households benefit more from the 1992 tax 
reform than from a having a further reform towards a flat tax regime. 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to account for general equilibrium (GE) effects. However, 
we should expect that GE effects would have pushed down wages, in particular in the private sector 
,and we should also expect that the average gain measured by CV would decrease.The estimated 
effects of tax reforms on labor supply should thus be considered as upper bounds. 
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Appendix A. Data 
Data on the labor supply of married women in Norway used in this study consist of a merged sample 
of the “Survey of Income and Wealth, 1994” and the “Level of living conditions, 1995” (Statistics 
Norway, 1994 and 1995, respectively). Data cover married couples as well as cohabiting couples with 
common children. The ages of the spouses range from 25 to 64. None of the spouses is self-employed 
and none of them is on disability or other type of benefits. A person is classified as a wageworker if 
their income from wage work is higher than their income from self-employment. All taxes paid are 
observed and in the assessment of disposable income, at hours not observed, all details of the tax 
system are accounted for. Hours of work are calculated as the sum of hours of the main job as well as 
those of any side jobs. A large majority of the women have only one job. 
 Wage rates above NOK 350 or below NOK 403 are not utilized when estimating the wage 
equations. The wage rates are computed as the ratio of annual wage income to hours worked. When 
computing annual wage income, we take into account the fact that some women have multiple jobs. 
The size of the sample used in estimating the labor supply model is 810. Descriptions of variables and 
summary statistics are given below. 
3 In May  2008, 1 USD≈NOK 5.00 
30 
Table A.1. Description of the variables used in the analysis (values in NOK, 1994) 
Symbols Description 
FNR Identification number   
FAR Woman Year of birth 
B02 Number of children 0-2 
B36 Number of children 3-6 
B717 Number of children 7-17 
B06 Number of children 0-6 
MALDER Age in year (man) 
MUTD Education in year (man) 
KALDER Age in year (woman) 
KUTD Education in year (woman) 
INR Choice variable of working hours: 1-15   
ARBTID Annual hours of work as follows:   
 INR =1 ARBTID = 0; 
 Public sector  Private sector  
  INR =2 ARBTID = 315;    INR =9 ARBTID = 315;   
  INR =3 ARBTID = 780;    INR =10 ARBTID = 780;   
  INR =4 ARBTID = 1040;     INR =11 ARBTID = 1040;    
  INR =5 ARBTID = 1560;    INR =12 ARBTID = 1560;   
  INR =6 ARBTID = 1976;    INR =13 ARBTID = 1976;   
  INR =7 ARBTID = 2340;  INR =14 ARBTID = 2340; 
  INR =8 ARBTID = 2600;  INR =15 ARBTID = 2600; 
KAPINNT Household capital income  
MANNLONN Men wage income per year 
Variable generated: 
KUTD_100 Woman Education in year  (KUTD) /100 
SKILL Work Experience = woman age–woman education in year (KUTD) – six 
(starting school age)  
SK_100 SKILL/100 
SK2_100 (SKILL/100)2  
CAPINC Net capital income (CAPINC)=KAPINNT–CHALL as KAPINNT 
includes CHALL.  
CHALL is child allowances, see Appendix B 
W_PU Woman hourly wage in public sector  
W_PR Woman hourly wage in private sector  
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics, number of observations = 810 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
FAR 53.92 9.04 30.00 69.00 
B02 0.23 0.45 0.00 2.00 
B36 0.30 0.56 0.00 3.00 
B717 0.66 0.85 0.00 4.00 
MALDER 42.80 9.17 25.00 66.00 
MUTD 12.05 2.49 9.00 19.00 
KALDER 40.07 9.04 25.00 64.00 
LNKALDER 3.66 0.22 3.22 4.16 
KUTD 11.61 2.15 9.00 17.00 
INR 7.83 4.01 1.00 15.00 
B06 0.54 0.77 0.00 3.00 
ARBTID 1482.89 664.97 0.00 2600.00 
SEKTOR 1.34 0.61 0.00 2.00 
KUTD_100 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.17 
SKILL 22.45 9.63 2.00 49.00 
SK_100 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.49 
SK2_100 0.05 0.04 0.0004 0.24 
KAPINNT 32306.71 42378.48 0.00 568403.00 
CHALL 13094.37 12154.01 0.00 60084.00 
KVLONN 149751.97 83060.53 0.00 581693.00 
MANNLONN 274372.89 106239.67 17312.00 1184861.00 
W_PU 89.36 12.09 64.88 132.34 
W_PR 109.77 13.68 80.14 156.44 
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Appendix B. Tax functions and child allowances 
Table B.1. Tax function in 1994 for a married nonworking woman whose husband is working, 
OK 1994 
Mannlonn, Ymale Tax T 
0–41907 0 
41907–140500 0.302Ymale–12656 
140500–252000 0.358Ymale–20524 
252000–263000 0.453Ymale–44464 
263000– 0.495Ymale–55510 
 
 
Table B.2. Tax function in 1994 for a married working woman or man, NOK 1994 
Wage income, Y Tax T 
0–20954 0 
20954–140500 0.302Y–6328 
140500–208000 0.358Y–14196 
208000–236500 0.453Y–33956 
236500– 0.495Y–43889 
 
In 1994, the child allowances were: 
• One child between 0 and 17 years: NOK 10416 
• Two children between 0 and 17 years: NOK 21336 
• Three children between 0 and 17 years: NOK 33696 
• Four children between 0 and 17 years: NOK 46692 
• Five children or more between 0 and 17 years: NOK 60084 
 
 
Table B.3. Tax function in 1991 for a married nonworking woman, whose husband is working, 
NOK 1994 
Mannlonn, Ymale Tax T 
0–38392 0 
38392–70746 0.303Ymale–11642 
70746–171915 0.343Ymale–14455 
171915–200567 0.418Ymale–27348 
200567–264239 0.558Ymale–55428 
264239– 0.654Ymale–80509 
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Table B. 4. Tax function in 1991 for a married working woman, or working man. NOK 1994 
Wage income Y Tax T 
0–19596 0 
19596–22639 0.343Y–6722 
22639–70746 0.303Y–5832 
70746–137956 0.343Y–8634 
137956–174037 0.418Y–18981 
174037–219669 0.558Y–42964 
219669– 0.654Y–64214 
 
